Abstract
Introduction
The network nodes of underwater acoustic communication are randomly deployed in an unknown area, in this case, the neighbors are unknown, and it is very difficult to set up the entire network in advance for all possible security key, so the secure key establishment process is the core problem in security management. Pre-shared key is the easiest kind of key establishment process, and the required key in node communication is stored in the network nodes by the Key Distribution Center prior to deployment. Because the scheme of key pre-distribution in the system is almost completed prior to the deployment, and it is generally based on a simple and efficient symmetric encryption algorithm, widely used in distributed, self-organizing wireless communication networks [1] [2] [3] [4] .
In this paper, the key pre-distribution mechanism will be studied in the underwater acoustic communication network environment. And the typical random key predistribution scheme is analyzed, a method of grouping key distribution based on polynomial protocol is proposed and experimentally demonstrated, and its feasibility is demonstrated in a static simulation of underwater acoustic communication network.
(1) Process of node key pre-distribution prior to deployment. The random key pool will be constructed, it contains the S kinds of different keys (S is large enough), and each key has a unique identifier ID. The k key will be extracted at random from the key pool in each node, and the keys will be saved to the memory, and then the extracted keys back into the key pool. So that, the k keys and key chain with identifier can be formatted in each node. Accordin g to Erdos random graph theory, the probability that the key can be shared by two nodes is given by [7] .
(2) Phase of shared key discovery, it occurs after completing node deployment. Two adjacent nodes can exchange the key identifier, the identifier is retrieved based on its own secret key string to determine whether the same key. If two neighbors have at least one same key, then select one as the shared key. Thus, there is a secure link in the figure of key shared between two neighbors.
(3) Phase of shared key indirect negotiation. If there is no public key between two nodes, it can be negotiation to share key through a third party as an intermediary neighbors with the public key of the two nodes, the process is known as shared key indirect negotiation phase, this process can ensure normal communication across the network.
Since kS  , between any two neighboring nodes exist only in a probabilistic public key, which is the two neighbor nodes exist only in a probabilistic safety chain, this probability is the probability of network security connectivity p. For the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme, the key goal is to design a suitable S and k, so that the p can reaches a predetermined expectations, making the network's key sharing Pictured connected graph, thus ensuring the security of the entire network communication.
Random Key Pre-Distribution Model of q-Composite
The Eschenauer-Gligor scheme only requires two neighbor nodes to share a common key, so the secure link can be established if the node simply stores small kinds of keys, it can reduce the node's storage overhead, but the node is weak against external attacks. To enhance the node anti-attack capability, the EschenauerGligor scheme was extended, and the q-composite random key pre-distribution scheme is proposed by Chan, Perrig and Song [8] . The scheme and the basic model is in a similar procedure, only requires the number of adjacent nodes is larger than q public key to establish a secure communications link. In all the shared key information received, if the shared key between two nodes quantity exceeds q, is a ' q , then all ' q share the key generation with a key k,
where the hash is a public ha Greek function. Similarly, in the q -composite scheme International Journal of Security and Its Applications Vol. 9, No.11 (2015) 316
Copyright ⓒ 2015 SERSC probability of network connectivity is based on probability theory and random g raph theory calculations, is given by
Where p(i) is extracted from the S-key pre-distribution of k to the node, the two neighbor nodes have the probability with the i same key. According to the total probability Equation, any two nodes can directly establish a shared secret with probability.
1 ( (0) (1) ... ( 1))
The key agreement scheme overhead of q-composite is basically the same as the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme, and the only difference is, q-composite scheme requires more than once a hash computed shared key. However, the energy consumption of the hash computation is relatively small, and broadcast key identifier shared key discovery phase only once, this part of the overhead is not.
From the above analysis, improved the value of q can improve the resistance to attack networks and shared key number q difficulty exponentially. But in ord er to ensure network connectivity, namely secure network shared key between any two points more than the probability q to achieve the desired probability value p, it is necessary to reduce the size of the entire key pool to increase the shared key between nodes degree of overlap. Narrow key pool will have a negative effect, the enemy captured a few key nodes can get a lot of space, it will seriously affect the security of the network. So for the use of this program network, its security and connectivity is a contradiction. The experimental results show that when q = 2 can achieve optimal network performance.
Key Pre-Distribution Scheme Converged Packet Design

Ideas of Grouping Design
Polynomial-based key pre-distribution scheme has a safe threshold, and it has better anti-attack capability than the key pre-distribution scheme based on random probability. Initially, an approach based on the finite field GF (q) symmetric polynomial key pre-distribution is proposed by Blundo [9] , and then the scheme is further optimized by Liu and Ning [10] [11] , and it constructs on t-order symmetric binary polynomial at randomly over a finite field GF (q) .
Where q is sufficiently large primes, before node deployment, the polynomial can pre-distributed for each node, the node i, and distribution f(i, y), for node j, the predistribution f(j, y). After node deployment, it should be calculated to go through polynomial shared key, calculated as follows: node i for j compute node j for i calculated by the symmetry of a polynomial ( , ) ( , ) f i j f j i 317 threat to the network node, when the node to be captured is greater than the safety threshold, network security will decline rapidly. In order to improve network security, while achieving better connectivity probability of key network nodes, in this paper introduces the polynomial grouped on the basis of calculations designed is introduced to make up for the lack of programs based on polynomial. The basic idea of grouping nodes is to deploy the entire region into a plurality of nodes distributed grids, and each grid corresponds to a node deployment groups, each group of nodes deployed deploy only to the group corresponding to the grid area. Assumed that the wireless sensor network has n nodes and it is divided into g groups, each group has g n nodes. Each group is assigned a unique identifier for GD, each member of the group node is assigned node identifier for ND, within different groups the same node identifier range is used, while in the same group is relatively unique identifier for each node. Thus, any node has a globally unique identifier for network expansion || D GD ND 
. For example, a 1000 wireless sensor network nodes, all nodes are divided into 10 groups, each with 100 nodes, each group GD assign 0-9 for each group node allocation ND 0 to 99, any node in group 2 as a network identifier node 6 can be expressed as D=2| |6. Actual operation is expressed in binary form. And random key is the scheme of the program in the same node for each node before deployment is assigned a unique node identifier, but random key pre-distribution scheme in the node identifier is randomly assigned, and the scheme for each node identifier where the group related to it is easier to determine whether the same set of nodes.
Assuming a 33  square region of the deployment region shown in Figure 1 , and each node within the grid can obey binomial distribution. Network Control Center does not directly distribute keys to the node, but distributed in GF (q) on randomly generated symmetric binary polynomial to the node. Node deployment, the system in GF (q) can generate on randomly binary symmetric S-containing symmetrical polynomial pool, k polynomial can be drawn out to every node. If a node's key capacity is m, each node distributes k polynomial, as the amount of each key polynomial t +1, then m = k (t +1).
After node deployment, if two neighbors have the same polynomial, directly establish a shared key, if two neighbors have no same polynomial, third -party neighbor nodes with the same polynomial can be found to establish a shared key indirect negotiations.
Figure 1. Nodes Grouping Deployment
Grouping deployment can achieve some better results, such as the following:
(1) The network connectivity is not reduced, at the same time the storage information in each node can be reduced, which is particularly important for the sensor nodes.
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(3) The impact for betraying local area network key is limited by using grouping deployment. can be randomly generated according to number of the network packets, and then all the nodes divide into some groups, a unique identifier D is assigned and stored in the node, at the same time, and the private shared polynomial and the neighbor 8 groups corresponding polynomial can be loaded to the node of each group.
Key Management
Shared Key Discovery:
At this stage, it is assumed to the node a broadcasts its own identifier Da to the neighbor b, after receiving the broadcast, the node b estimates the identifier Da whether or not they are in the same group, if in the same group, they will be calculated and stored for ()
, and its own identifier D is transferred to the node a, after receiving identifier D, they will be calculated and saved for ()
where ab K is the link-shared key, then the two nodes complete the process of establishing shared key.
If two nodes are different groups, the node b can estimate whether it is one of neighbors based on the group number, if it is the neighbor group, it is determine t o use the appropriate polynomial according to its group number, and then, the own identifier D is transferred to the node a, after received the request, the node b will put the D into polynomials in this group, and can obtain the shared key.
Security Link Establishment :
After completing the shared key, if the two nodes obtain the shared key, the key is used as two nodes communicate key for the future, if two nodes needed to communicate have no the same key, the two nodes need to find a safe path between nodes by using intermediate nodes. The method is as following, first, the source node sends target node identifier D to the neighbors with shared key, and each neighbor will find out the nodes with shared key. If it is the target node, then the security path is established, otherwise it continues broadcasting to its neighbors, until a safe path is obtained. The source node generates a key after the establishment of safe path, and the key will be sent to the target node through this secure link.
Analysis of Performance
Analysis of Connectivity
In this scheme, it assumes that n is the mumble of nodes in a static underwater acoustic communication network, and it were divided into g groups, there are ng nodes in each groups, P is a probability of shared key between two nodes, and m represents the number of the key pair in each node. For node A and B, node A does not share any key, and node B is different group of two nodes.
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Considering the most secure connectivity probability, the probability is obtained: 
For random key pre-distribution scheme, the minimum safe node connectivity probability p can obtained by using p=m/n, in general, for the larger network, m << n, so
can be guaranteed to be a positive. Thus, the scheme can be obtained that secure connectivity probability is greater than random key predistribution scheme.
Analysis of Calculating Load
Between neighbors the main computing shared key overhead is O(t) times modular multiplication. Respect to symmetric encryption algorithm, the polynomial modular multiplication is an expensive larger operation, and it should also take into account two points: the calculation of shared key discovery polynomial is done only once, and it does not need to be calculated after obtaining the shared key. Relative to the same modular multiplication, the computation is still relatively small by using asymmetric encryption algorithm.
Analysis of Node Anti-capture Capability
In the random key pre-distribution scheme, the betrayed node key is likely to lead to other nodes key exposure, and affect other nodes communicate securely, it great harms to network security. And in this scheme, if multiple nodes are captured, it will only disclose this group or adjacent groups sharing key pair, and it does not affect other groups in the network nodes. In this paper, network simulation tool OMNeT + + is used as the primary experimental platform, Figure 2 , is the capturing probability versus different numbers of captured nodes under conditions of n=1000, m=200.
From the Figure 2 we can see that the capturing probability increase as the numbers of captured nodes. The capturing probability of a communication link is less than the probability of the E-G and q-composite scheme in the network. And the network security is fully guaranteed by using polynomial-based key computing in aspect of anti-capture. Theoretical analysis and experimental results show that the scheme proposed in this paper can not only ensure network connectivity, but also improve the network's anti-attack capability. The network security, connectivity and the load in the static underwater acoustic communication can r each a good balance by using the designed scheme.
